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Abstract
This article reviews the literature on Europeanization beyond the group of EU member,
“quasi-member” and applicant states. It uses the analysis of Europeanization in applicant
states as a theoretical starting point to ask if, how and under which conditions we can expect
domestic effects of European integration beyond Europe. Focusing on Europeanization effects
in the areas of regionalism, democracy and human rights, and the literature on the European
Neighborhood Policy in particular, the article collects findings on the strategies and instru-
ments as well as the impact and effectiveness of the EU. The general conclusion to be drawn
from the theoretical and empirical literature reviewed is one of low consistency and impact.
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Europeanization beyond Europe 5
1 Introduction
At first, “Europeanization beyond Europe” seems an improbable candidate for a literature review.
The skeptical reader may first ask: “Is there a literature on Europeanization beyond Europe?”
The study of Europeanization is largely confined to the impact of European integration and gov-
ernance on the member states of the European Union (EU) (see the Living Reviews by Goetz
and Meyer-Sahling 2008; Ladrech 2009; Treib 2008). A few studies have expanded the scope
of Europeanization analysis to the “quasi-member states,” specifically Norway and Switzerland
(e.g. Fischer, Nicolet, and Sciarini 2002; Lægreid, Steinthorsson, and Thorhallsson 2004; Mach,
Ha¨usermann, and Papadopoulos 2003; Sciarini, Fischer, and Nicolet 2004; Sverdrup and Kux
2000). Even more recently, the study of Europeanization has begun to include candidate states
for EU membership (see the Living Review by Sedelmeier 2006). But is there any literature on
“Europeanization beyond Europe”, that is, countries that are not eligible for membership in the
foreseeable future? The editors of a recent compilation of Europeanization research admit, while
positing that the scope of Europeanization is not conceptually limited to the impact of the EU on
its member states, that their own handbook is no exception from this focus (Vink and Graziano
2007: 9, 12). None of its 25 chapters deal with Europeanization beyond accession countries. In
addition, a title search in any major literature database combining the keyword “Europeanization”
with the names of major countries or continents will yield few useful results, while those found
are likely to be full of “noise” – articles and books that are actually about member and candidate
states or those that use “Europeanization” in a very loose and metaphorical sense with few, if any,
references to the Europeanization literature in political science studies of the EU.
Second and more fundamentally, the skeptical reader may argue that the available literature
fails to mention “Europeanization” for a good reason and ask: “Is there Europeanization beyond
Europe?” It is certainly plausible to assume that EU organizations, policies and decisions have a
relevant domestic impact on member states, quasi-member states that participate in the internal
market and the candidate states that must adopt the acquis communautaire to qualify for mem-
bership. But can the EU also have a systematic and distinctive influence of this kind beyond
Europe?
This is a legitimate question that has triggered my interest for doing this review. What does the
literature tell us about the EU’s goals and instruments in this area? What are the “mechanisms”
of Europeanization beyond the group of actual and would-be members? To what extent and under
which conditions has the EU been effective in Europeanizing countries beyond its membership
region? A practical comparative starting point for answering these questions is found in the
related field of Europeanization of candidate and accession countries (Sedelmeier 2006).
(1) In the case of quasi-members and candidate countries, it is clear that the transfer of the
acquis communautaire is at the core of Europeanization. Participation in the highly regulated
single market requires the adoption of its rules, and EU enlargement has always been based on
the principle that new members must transpose the entire acquis, albeit with varying transition
periods. Beyond the EU, the European Economic Area (EEA), and candidate countries, the
content appears less predetermined. So what is the substance of Europeanization beyond Europe?
Which ideas, norms, rules, organizational structures and procedures, behavioral patterns, etc.,
spread intentionally or unintentionally beyond integrated Europe?
(2) Whereas the EU uses the incentive of membership as the main – and generally effective –
lever to make applicant countries adopt its rules, at least formally, this instrument is not applicable
to countries currently ineligible for EU membership. Which other instruments and strategies does
the EU then have at its disposal? And can these instruments and strategies be successful in the
absence of the membership incentive and the accession conditionalities that often come with it?
(3) Finally, has the EU been able to transfer its rules and practices beyond the confines of its
member and candidate countries? While there is no doubt that a massive transfer of EU rules and
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practices is taking place during the accession phase in countries aspiring to become EU members,
it is far from obvious that countries outside the group of potential member states should be subject
to Europeanization in a similarly pervasive way.
To be sure, there is growth in the amount of literature concerning EU external policies that
are directed towards or likely to affect the domestic political systems, politics and policies of states
beyond Europe. But “Europeanization” is rarely mentioned in this literature, let alone featured
in the titles of books and articles. Rather, this literature examines the EU as an international
or global actor or as a civilian or normative power; covers the EU’s foreign or external policy
or policies; or discusses the EU’s relations with various regions of the world. In addition, this
literature focuses on what the EU is in the international system (“actor”, “presence”, or “system”;
“civilian”, “trade” or “normative power”, to name several favored concepts) and what it does in
its external relations (policy decisions, content, instruments and strategies) rather than if and
how it affects third countries. Moreover, to the extent that the literature does study the impact
of the EU, it concentrates primarily on the impact of the EU on the international system (e.g.
its influence on the balance of power) or on specific international regimes such as international
climate or trade policy. What remains is a very small selection of literature studying the domestic
impact of the EU beyond Europe – which is the core of the Europeanization research agenda. This
review will therefore be based to a large extent on a second reading of this relevant portion of
EU external relations literature, focusing on what we can learn from these works for the study of
Europeanization.
As a consequence, this review cannot be based on seminal books or articles on “Europeanization
beyond Europe” but needs to start from substantive questions and theoretical perspectives in order
to locate and collect answers scattered across the literature. The main body of the review includes
five parts: The first introduces theoretical perspectives for studying Europeanization beyond Eu-
rope. The subsequent parts follow the three questions arising from comparing Europeanization
beyond Europe with Europeanization in the accession states: goals and contents; instruments
and strategies; effectiveness and impact. Recently, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) has
attracted more scholarly analysis, which will be the focus of a separate section. The ENP is a
framework for all neighbors of the EU that do not have an explicit membership perspective. It
comprises Moldova and Ukraine (and potentially Belarus, but not Russia) as well as the Northern
African and Middle Eastern neighbors of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The ENP can be
seen as a most-likely case for Europeanization beyond Europe because it deals with close neighbors,
covers a broad range of policies, and is based on the explicit commitment of the EU to extend its
acquis beyond membership. In the final section, I draw a few general conclusions on the findings
of the literature and the future research agenda.
This version of the review will focus on general principles of political order promoted by the
EU (regionalism, democracy, and human rights) and on comparative analyses of Europeanization
beyond Europe. Future updates and revisions of this review will include studies focusing on further
specific regions and countries as well as specific EU policies.
2 Theoretical perspectives
In general, the study of Europeanization beyond Europe could benefit from the entire range of
theoretical approaches that have been developed and put forward for analyzing Europeanization
in the member states (for a brief overview, see Bulmer 2007). Here, however, I will limit myself
to theoretical perspectives that have been used recently to analyze Europeanization beyond the
borders of the EU – but mainly with regard to accession countries. All of them specify mechanisms
of EU impact, and the conditions under which they operate and are effective, as building blocks
for a theory of Europeanization.
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(1) In their analysis of Europeanization in the accession countries of Central and Eastern
Europe, Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (2004; 2005a) distinguish mechanisms of
Europeanization according to two dimensions; On one hand, Europeanization can be EU-driven
or domestically driven. On the other, it can be driven by institutional logics: the “logic of con-
sequences” or the “logic of appropriateness” (March and Olsen 1989: 160–162). According to the
logic of consequences, Europeanization can be driven by the EU through sanctions and rewards
that alter the cost-benefit calculations of the target state (external incentives model). The impact
of external incentives increases with the size of net benefits and the clarity and credibility of EU
conditionality. According to the logic of appropriateness, Europeanization may be induced by so-
cial learning. Target states are persuaded to adopt EU rules if they consider these rules legitimate
and identify with the EU. These mechanisms can be implemented either through intergovernmen-
tal interactions (bargaining or persuasion) or through transnational processes via societal actors
within the target state (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005a: 11–12, 18). Finally, according to
the lesson-drawing model, states turn to the EU as a result of dissatisfaction with the domestic
status quo and adopt EU rules if they perceive them as solutions to their problems, either based
on instrumental calculations or the appropriateness of the EU solutions.
(2) In a study on the external dimension of Europeanization in the area of immigration policy,
Sandra Lavenex and Emek Uc¸arer distinguish four modes of EU external governance differing in
the extent to which intentional action of the EU or domestic interest of third countries triggers
adaptation (Lavenex and Uc¸arer 2004: 420–421). “Unilateral policy emulation” occurs when third
countries are convinced of the superiority of the EU’s rules and adopt them in order to more
efficiently solve domestic problems. “Negative externalities” occurs if non-adaptation would create
net costs. However, the presence of an EU requirement may produce policy transfer on the basis of
opportune conditionality if the requirement meets the interests of the third country, or inopportune
conditionality if adaptation is not in its interest but is compensated by other incentives.
(3) In their study of the impact of the EU on border conflicts, Thomas Diez, Stephan Stetter,
and Mathias Albert (2006) construct a two-by-two table to conceptualize four “pathways of EU im-
pact”. They distinguish pathways first according to “whether the impact is generated by concrete
EU measures or an effect of integration processes that are not directly influenced by EU actors”
(Diez, Stetter, and Albert 2006: 571). In addition, the impact can be on concrete policies or
have wider social implications. The first pathway is “compulsory impact” – working with concrete
measures, namely carrots and sticks, on concrete policies. The “connective impact” is established
through concrete (mainly financial) measures establishing and supporting contact between conflict-
ing parties. The other pathways function indirectly. According to the “enabling impact”, actors
in conflict situations strengthen their influence by linking their political agendas and positions to
the EU. Finally, the “constructive impact” results in a fundamental reconstruction of identities as
a result of exposure to European integration (Diez, Stetter, and Albert 2006: 572–574).
(4) Michael Bauer, Christoph Knill, and Diana Pitschel (2007) use the trichotomy of EU gov-
ernance modes in regulatory policy – compliance, competition and communication (Knill and
Lenschow 2005) – to analyze domestic change in Central and Eastern Europe. Compliance is a
coercive mechanism triggered by legally binding EU rules that national administrations must im-
plement in order to avoid sanctions. Whereas compliance is linked to “positive integration”, i.e.
the formal harmonization of national rules, competition is related to “negative integration”, i.e.
the abolition of national barriers distorting the common market. In this mode of governance, the
impact of the EU is less direct and works through market pressures rather than institutional sanc-
tions. “Institutional change is thus stimulated by the need to improve the functional effectiveness
of member states’ institutional arrangements in comparison to those of other participants within
the common market.” (Bauer, Knill, and Pitschel 2007: 411) Finally, communication is defined as
a governance mode that brings about change as a result of voluntary information exchange and
mutual learning between national policy-makers in EU-sponsored networks. Rather than direct
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sanctions from the EU or indirect sanctions from the market, it is the legitimacy of policy models
that drives Europeanization.
Obviously, there is considerable overlap between these conceptualizations. The classifications by
Diez et al. and Bauer et al. also implicitly distinguish between logics of action; in contrast to Bauer
et al., Diez et al., Lavenex and Uc¸arer as well as Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier distinguish between
direct EU-driven and indirect pathways of Europeanization. Finally, all classifications emphasize
the ability of Europeanization to function through intergovernmental as well as transnational
channels. Table 1 presents an attempt to map this conceptual overlap. It also shows the vacant
fields in the three categorizations for which I suggest additional concepts.
Table 1: Mechanisms of EU impact beyond the member-states
Intergovernmental Transnational
Direct Indirect Direct Indirect
Logic of
conse-
quences
(1) Conditionality
Intergovernmental
incentives
Compulsory impact
Compliance
(2) Externalization
Competition
Negative externality
(3) Transnational
incentives
Connective impact
(4) Transnational
externalization
Competition
Logic of
appropri-
ateness
(5) Socialization
Intergovernmental
social learning
Constructive impact
Communication
(6) Imitation
Lesson-drawing
Enabling impact
Unilateral emulation
(7) Transnational
socialization
Transnational social
learning
(8) Societal
imitation
Enabling impact
Conditionality and socialization are the two fundamental mechanisms of EU impact that are
compared and contrasted in most of the literature (see e.g. Coppieters et al. 2004; Kelley 2004;
Kubicek 2003). Conditionality (1) is based on the direct, sanctioning impact of the EU on the target
government and subsumes the intergovernmental channel of external incentives, the compulsory
impact and the compliance mode of governance. In the conditionality mode the EU provides non-
member governments with incentives such as financial aid, market access or institutional ties on
the condition that they follow the EU’s demands. By contrast, socialization (5) comprises all EU
efforts to “teach” EU policies – as well as the ideas and norms behind them – to outsiders, to
persuade outsiders that these policies are appropriate and, as a consequence, to motivate them
to adopt EU policies. Socialization subsumes intergovernmental “social learning”, “constructive
impact” and “communication”. All other mechanisms of EU impact are best seen as varieties of
these two fundamental logics – varieties that work more indirectly and/or transnationally than
conditionality and socialization.
Transnational incentives and socialization (3 and 7): The EU’s conditionality and socialization
can be directed at societal actors – parties, firms, interest groups, NGOs or even regional adminis-
trations – rather than central governments. In the “transnational incentive” or, according to Diez,
Stetter, and Albert (2006), “connective” mode of governance, the EU provides these non-state
actors with incentives to follow EU rules themselves and/or to put pressure on their governments
to adopt EU rules. Likewise, in the “transnational socialization” mode of governance, the EU may
try to persuade these societal actors of its values, norms, or policy ideas. Societal actors will then
work to disseminate these ideas further domestically.
Externalization (2 and 4): Conditionality, transnational incentives and transnational social-
ization are similar in one respect – the EU seeks to directly induce non-member actors to adopt
and follow its rules. There are also, however, indirect modes of EU external governance. In this
view the EU is a “presence” (Allen and Smith 1990) rather than an actor in its external relations.
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The EU’s impact on third countries is a result of its capacity as an important system of regional
governance and has an indirect (sometimes even unintended or unanticipated) effect on internal
regulations and policies. According to the logic of consequences, internal EU governance may
produce negative externalities towards third country governments and societal actors. External
actors adopt and comply with EU rules because ignoring or violating them would generate net
costs. This “governance by externalization” is most noticeably produced by the EU’s internal
market and competition policies; firms interested in participating in the EU market must follow
the EU’s rules. This is similar to the competition mode of governance described by Bauer, Knill,
and Pitschel (2007) and “negative externalities” (Lavenex and Uc¸arer 2004). It may affect societal
actors, such as firms and business associations, as well as governments that are induced to alter
their own rules and policies in line with those of the EU.
Imitation (6 and 8): The EU’s processes and policies may provide a model for other regions,
states and societal actors. Here, the logic of appropriateness is at work. Non-member actors
imitate the EU because they recognize EU rules and policies as appropriate solutions to their
own problems. This is in line with “lesson-drawing” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005a) or
“deliberate emulation” (Lavenex and Uc¸arer 2004) by governments as well as non-state actors,
and also resembles the “enabling impact” of the EU, which describes the use of EU policies and
solutions by governmental and societal actors to add external legitimacy to their own political
agenda (Diez, Stetter, and Albert 2006: 573).
I suggest that these mechanisms could also be effectively used to theorize “Europeanization be-
yond the EU”. The question then remains, under which conditions these mechanisms operate and
are effective beyond the EU’s member and candidate states. None of the studies reviewed above
generate high expectations of impact in this regard. According to the analyses in Schimmelfennig
and Sedelmeier (2005b), the EU’s impact in candidate countries has resulted primarily from the
external incentives of accession conditionality rather than social learning or lesson-drawing. Demo-
cratic conditionality ahead of accession negotiations has worked best when countries had a credible
promise of eventual membership and when the domestic power costs of adopting democratic and
human rights norms were low, i.e. did not threaten regime survival. Acquis conditionality regarding
specific EU rules began to have a major effect only after accession negotiations commenced.
Diez, Stetter, and Albert (2006) find that the “transformative power of integration” in border
conflicts is strongest when all parties to the conflict are EU members; much weaker when parties
are only associated with the EU; and even negative when the external border of the EU coincides
with the contested border. According to Diez, Stetter, and Albert this is not only because of
conditionality. Membership, and association to a lesser extent, also increases the legitimacy of EU
positions (enabling impact), support for common activities (connective impact) and exposure to
the constructive impact (Diez, Stetter, and Albert 2006: 573–574, 588).
Finally, Bauer, Knill, and Pitschel (2007) also generally expect the potential impact of the
EU to be higher in states with strong prospects for membership than in “unlikely members”.
Again, this not only applies to the governance mode of compliance (conditionality). Whereas the
compliance mode is expected to have no effect in non-candidate countries, both competition and
communication are hypothesized to have at least a limited effect in the long term due to the fact
that non-candidate countries are subject to market pressures generated by the EU and participate
in EU-sponsored policy networks.
3 Goals and contents
What is the substantive content of Europeanization beyond Europe? What kind of intentional or
unintentional domestic impact does the EU have on third countries? In general, Europeanization
covers a broad range of political impacts across the triad of polity, politics and policy.
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Perhaps the most accessible general characterization of the literature of Europeanization beyond
Europe follows the thesis of “domestic analogy”. According to this thesis polities prefer to have
an international environment that is ordered according to their own principles and procedures.
The substantive goals – as well as instruments – thus mirror the fundamental principles of the EU
and European integration (Peters and Wagner 2005: 215–216); Europeanization consists of “the
external projection of internal solutions” (Lavenex 2004: 695).
This general characterization entails various, more specific claims regarding the goals that the
EU pursues globally.
First, the EU promotes its model of regionalism to other regions. It proposes regional economic
and market integration and the establishment of supranational organizations as pathways to peace
and welfare in other parts of the world (Bicchi 2006; Farrell 2007). The regionalist model is also
evident in the tendency of the EU to design its policies for, and conclude agreements with, regional
groupings of countries rather than with individual states.
Second, and perhaps in a more critical perspective, the EU is often known to propagate a
“neoliberal” economic model, which reflects the EU’s internal commitment to market-building and
economic liberalization (see, e.g., Hurt 2003, 2004). Others point out, however, that the EU does
not stand for free-market policies as such but for a multilaterally managed “regulatory framework
for liberal markets” according to its own model (Grugel 2004: 616; Woolcock 2005: 396).
Third, the EU promotes constitutional norms such as human rights, the rule of law and democ-
racy in its external relations (e.g. Manners 2002: 240–241). Mirroring the debate surrounding
the economic model advocated by the EU, Gordon Crawford asserts that, in this case, the EU
promotes a rather limited democracy assistance agenda “oriented at challenging state power and
sustaining economic liberalisation rather than extending popular participation and control”, and
thus “consistent with the maintenance of neo-liberal hegemony” (Crawford 2005: 594, 596).
In sum, the EU as a regionally integrated system of liberal democracies, regionalism, regulated
transnational markets and democratic constitutionalism define the essence of being “European”.
“Europeanization” then includes promoting regionally integrated liberal democracies beyond its
borders. From a rational perspective, an international environment that mirrors the EU is likely to
be in the best interest of the EU and its member states. It is an environment that they are familiar
with – and know to use to their benefit. This reduces adaptation and information costs and gives
them an advantage over non-EU actors that are less familiar with such an environment (Peters and
Wagner 2005: 216). Others, however, emphasize shared values and norms as well as established
routines and templates of the EU as the source of these goals. Federica Bicchi, for instance, suggests
that EU external policy can “be seen as unreflexive behaviour mirroring the deeply engrained belief
that Europe’s history is a lesson for everybody. Put briefly, [it] is informed, at least partially, by
the idea that ‘our size fits all”’ (Bicchi 2006: 287). Regional economic integration and liberal
democracy thus represent strong beliefs and universally valid ideas of an effective political order
that are promoted regardless of calculations of benefit and feasibility.
The focus on more general principles of political order in “Europeanization beyond Europe”
may be an artifact of the literature that has indicated a strong interest in the normative content
of EU external policies and the EU as a value-driven actor and “normative power” (e.g. Manners
2002; Lucarelli and Manners 2006; Sjursen 2006a,b). It also, however, reflects the EU’s official
external relations doctrine. In addition, it is in line with the findings on Europeanization in
candidate countries (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005b): Prior to the accession process proper,
the focus on and impact of the EU’s specific acquis rules has been generally weak. Rather, the
EU’s constitutive political norms are prominent.
Yet the focus on regional integration and liberal democracy also raises questions. First of all,
what is understood as distinctly “European” in “Europeanization”? Whereas it may be granted
that regionalism is a unique feature of EU external relations, democracy, human rights and market
economy are Western principles propagated by non-EU Western countries (such as the United
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States) and other international organizations (e.g. the Council of Europe or the OECD) as well.
Moreover, the EU itself may have been influenced by broader tendencies and patterns in the in-
ternational system. Take, for instance, the “neoliberal” economic order the EU advocates in its
external relations. In this case the EU is not only part of a larger tendency represented by most
other international economic organizations (Hurt 2004); its own internal economic governance has
changed under the impact of “neoliberalism” as well. By the same token researchers must be
extremely careful in attributing liberal democratic domestic change in third countries to “Euro-
peanization”. The general problem of Europeanization research – that EU influences must be
analytically separated from international non-EU and domestic societal and political influences
– is more difficult the less EU-specific the rules in question and the less dense the institutional
relationship between the EU and a third country are.
Second, the arguments concerning the “domestic analogy” (Peters and Wagner 2005) or the
“ontological quality” of the EU as a “changer of norms” (Manners 2002: 252) clearly fail to
sufficiently take into account the evolution and changes of the EU’s “Europeanization” goals and
strategies over time. Both arguments suggest that, having been a regional organization of liberal
democratic countries from its very beginnings, the EU should also have engaged in promoting
its model from the start. Yet the promotion of regionalism, economic liberalism, human rights
and democracy has only become prominent since the early 1990s (see below). Instead, the global
political changes of the time (the end of the Cold War, the wave of democratization) and the
concomitant institutional enhancement of the EU as an international actor (the Common Foreign
Security Policy (CFSP) established in the Maastricht Treaty) seem to have spurred the explicit
definition and promotion of the EU model beyond Europe (Farrell 2007: 304).
Third, the focus on “nice” and general goals that are officially propagated and intentionally
pursued by the EU may come at the expense of studying more policy-specific, unintended or
even “nasty” domestic consequences of the EU’s presence in the world. As an effect of the EU’s
market power, for instance, producers and legislators in third countries will often be forced to
unilaterally adopt EU product standards. Consequently, we can observe policy- or issue-specific
Europeanization. Moreover, the effects of the protectionist Common Agricultural Policy on the
welfare and societal and political development of less developed countries have arguably been
extensive.
Finally, the focus in the literature on general political principles and constitutional goals should
not obscure the fact that the EU is predominantly a system of issue-specific, technical international
rules applied to a great variety of policy areas that make up its acquis communautaire (Magen
2007: 364–366). To a large extent, the EU propagates these rules directly in order to influence the
agenda and decision-making of international organizations and the policy-making and legislative
activities of third countries. In addition, however, the sheer weight of the EU market induces third
countries to adapt to or adopt EU rules in order to be able to participate in it.
In the remainder of the review I will focus largely on the general political principles pro-actively
advocated and pursued by the EU. In the subsequent section the focus will be placed on how these
principles have been pursued. Which instruments, strategies and mechanisms does the literature
identify?
4 Instruments and strategies
The literature is in broad agreement that the 1990s have witnessed a major change in EU external
policies: the establishment of conditionality, in particular political conditionality, as a core instru-
ment. Before the 1990s EU external relations had been notable for their apolitical content and the
principle of not interfering with the domestic systems of third countries. Since the beginning of
the 1990s, however, democracy, human rights and the rule of law have become “essential elements”
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in almost all EU agreements with third countries as both an objective and a condition of the in-
stitutionalized relationship. In case of violation, the EU may suspend or terminate the agreement
(Horng 2003). These goals were complemented later by “good governance”.
How did this policy change come about? It would be insufficient to simply attribute political
conditionality via domestic analogy to the constitutional values and norms of the EU, which had
existed before and did not change at the beginning of the 1990s. Outside the EU the changed
external political environment following the wave of democratization in 1989/90 was the major
influence. The wave of democratization not only strengthened the international legitimacy of
liberal democracy but also increased the need to support new and fledgling democracies. This was
complemented by the increasing acceptance in development policy circles that economic aid and
conditionality were insufficient in the absence of political reform and good governance. Inside the
EU the European Parliament was the major driving force. It could use the assent procedure for
treaties with third countries, which had been introduced by the Single European Act (SEA), to
press for political conditionality (Holland 2002: 120; Smith 2001).
EU conditionality is generally described as “positive”. It uses “carrots” rather than “sticks”
– rewards rather than punishment or assistance (Holland 2002: 132; Schimmelfennig 2005; Smith
2001; Youngs 2001a: 192). In spite of the “essential elements” clause, no agreements with third
countries have been suspended or terminated. According to Youngs, “in practice European policy
was in no significant way based on the use of coercive measures”; the EU has shown “no notable
propensity to impose punitive action directly in relation to democratic shortfalls”. “European
policy-makers saw a more positive, incentives-based form of conditionality as more legitimate and
potentially more effective” than the use of sticks (Youngs 2001a: 192). Below the level of treaty
relationships, however, the EU has, in fact, used the “stick”. In several cases financial aid was
withheld, reduced or suspended, and negotiations were delayed (e.g. Nwobike 2005). However,
“there is scant evidence of additional assistance to countries where things are improving” (Smith
2001: 190).
Conditionality is not the only mechanism of Europeanization observed – even in the field
of democracy and human rights promotion. In his study of EU democracy promotion in the
Mediterranean and East Asia, Richard Youngs finds evidence of two rather different strategies:
civil society support and socialization. In addition, he observes that the “profile of EU democracy
assistance funding in the two regions suggested a bottom-up approach, oriented overwhelmingly to
civil society support, and in particular human rights NGOs” (Youngs 2001a: 192; Youngs 2001b:
362). This is also true for Latin America where the EU has little leverage for using political
conditionality and has sought to develop direct links with civil society actors (Grugel 2004: 612).
On the other hand Youngs claims that “in light of the limits to positive and negative material
measures, EU strategy was characterized by an aim to develop deeply institutionalized patterns of
dialogue and co-operation as means of socializing political elites into a positive and consensual ad-
herence to democratic norms” (Youngs 2001a: 193). The EU used “generally accepted cooperation
over technical governance issues” in order to indirectly promote good governance and democracy
(Youngs 2001a: 195; 2001b: 363). According to Youngs the socialization approach is designed to
create opportunities for “imitation and demonstration effects” and starts with very modest ex-
pectations of introducing the vocabulary of democracy into domestic discourse and inducing elites
to, at the very least, publicly support democracy (Youngs 2001b: 359). It is these strategies,
rather than political conditionality, that bear evidence of a distinctive and innovative “European
approach” to democracy promotion and have been “unduly overlooked” (Youngs 2001a: 192, 195).
By contrast, the US approach to democracy promotion has been characterized by more “concrete
intervention” and a “more top-down, politicized . . . assistance” focusing on the “formal procedural
elements of democracy” (Youngs 2001b: 360, 363–364).
In sum, the Europeanization strategies identified by Youngs in the area of human rights and
democracy competition match the most important mechanisms identified in the theoretical litera-
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ture (see section 2 above): conditionality, (intergovernmental) socialization, and direct EU-society
links (via transnational socialization and domestic empowerment). The next question is whether
the literature on Europeanization beyond Europe also confirms expectations of weak impact.
5 Impact and Effectiveness
What impact has EU external governance had beyond member and candidate states? How and
to what extent has the EU been able to Europeanize non-European countries and regions? In
reviewing the literature I will again focus on regionalism and democracy/human rights. The
two criteria for evaluating EU policy most frequently found in the literature are consistency and
effectiveness.
5.1 Regionalism
According to Federica Bicchi the EU has consistently promoted regionalism and followed a regional
approach in its agreements and relations with non-European third countries around the world –
with the exception of EU-US bilateral relations (Bicchi 2006: 287–288). This rather consistent
approach across time and space and in spite of regional divergences strongly indicates that the EU
follows an organizational norm rather than functional considerations. This is particularly evident
with regard to regional policies addressing “regions” that have few objective regional characteristics
(such as high density of transactions) and do not perceive themselves as regional communities –
such as the “Mediterranean” or the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries. Rather, they
constitute “regions” mainly according to EU policy (Bicchi 2006: 288).
As Jean Grugel argues in a comparative analysis of EU and US policy vis-a`-vis Latin America,
this regionalism is also distinctively European. First, relations are discursively constructed as
“inter-regional partnerships”, “based around notions of equity and cooperation that ignores or
transcends the underlying power inequalities” (Grugel 2004: 607–608). Second, the EU “has
developed a conscious political leg to its new regionalism”, distinct from US-sponsored free-trade
associations, built around “the promotion of its own model of democracy, social welfare, and
regional integration”, understood as subregional integration within Latin America (Grugel 2004:
616).
If the EU’s promotion of regionalism has been consistent and distinctive, has it been isomorphic
as well? That is, have regional arrangements created and supported by the EU been modeled on
the EU example and have they been similar to each other? The great variety of interregional
cooperation arrangements seems to contradict the expectation of isomorphism (for an overview,
see Alecu de Flers and Regelsberger 2005). In addition, there appears to be disagreement as far as
the assessment of specific arrangements is concerned. For instance, whereas Bicchi argues that the
institutional settings and governance regimes of the EU and its Mediterranean policy (EMP) are
highly similar to international governance with regard to its multilateral institutional framework,
the emphasis on “economic matters but with a social flavour”, and the “eurocentric” transfer of the
Justice and Home Affairs agenda to the EMP (Bicchi 2006: 295–298), Joffe´ (2001) and Alecu de
Flers and Regelsberger (2005: 323) point to the fact that the Barcelona process has been modeled
on the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) rather than the EU.
The region that the EU seems to regard as most promising with regard to isomorphic regionalism
is Latin America, particularly its Southern Cone, which is culturally the most similar world region
and has also implemented a common market project (Mercosur) that might develop along European
lines (Grugel 2004: 616). Here, the EU seeks to spread its ideas of regional integration and good
governance through “research funding, seminar programmes, and the creation of a fund to provide
for the regular exchange of ideas within Latin America, in imitation of its own policies” (Grugel
2004: 612).
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Interestingly, however, it is the African Union (AU – designed in 2000) that mirrors the EU
most closely in institutional terms, with its Parliament, Commission, Executive Council of Minis-
ters, Court of Justice and plans for a common currency. The use of the EU template in this case
seems to have been a case of lesson-drawing or imitation rather than EU conditionality or social-
ization. However, the apparent supranational set-up of the AU is not matched by supranational
competences for these institutions (Farrell 2007: 312).
Unintended effects of the EU’s presence – rather than effects of intentional promotion of re-
gionalism – seem to have occurred in other regions and sub-regions as well. Christopher Hill and
Michael Smith point out that “the need to deal with a rich and powerful EU draws other states into
cooperative ventures, especially in their international relations” (Hill and Smith 2005: 396, their
italics) and list the South African Development Committee as well as the Asia-Europe Meeting
(ASEM) as examples. Although the EU might have unintentionally triggered regional cooperation
in these cases, the cooperation schemes did not follow the EU model of regionalism.
Both Thomas Christiansen, Petto, and Tonra (2000) and Anne Myrjord (2003) refer to the
ambivalent effects of the EU on regional institutions and region-building in adjacent regions. EU
neighborhood policies have reduced the divisive effects of enlargement and “minimized the impor-
tance of the institutional boundary between the Union and its environment” (Myrjord 2003: 251).
They represent “a turn towards an inclusive form of conducting EU external policy” and give non-
member countries a say in EU policy-making (Myrjord 2003: 251; see also Christiansen, Petto,
and Tonra 2000: 412). However, the often bilateral framework of negotiations between the EU and
third states tends to undermine the model of multilateral regional integration that the EU seeks to
promote, and external governance arrangements can only partially offset the disruptive effects of
the EU’s differentiation between members, candidates and non-candidates in neighboring regions
(Christiansen, Petto, and Tonra 2000: 407, 412). These findings are supported in the study by
Diez, Stetter, and Albert (2006), which claims that EU borders that adjoin existing border conflicts
exacerbate rather than mitigate these conflicts.
In addition, “an emerging dependence on relatively strong EU financial instruments carries the
potential of crowding out existing regional initiatives” (Myrjord 2003: 252). This effect will, of
course, depend on the existence and strength of endogenous region-building developments. Whereas
the EU may have had an overall disruptive effect in the Baltic and Nordic regions, where such
region-building efforts seem to have been relatively well developed, “even the limited efforts of
the EU to generate multilateralism constitute the main driving force in an externally directed
region-building effort” (Christiansen, Petto, and Tonra 2000: 412) in the Mediterranean.
With regard to Africa, Hurt is equally skeptical: “The history of regional integration projects
within the ACP group, especially in Africa, is one of consistent failure to achieve meaningful inte-
gration and development.” Moreover, the six new regions defined in the Cotonou Agreement1 of
2002 are “externally imposed and do not in most cases correspond to existing regional organiza-
tions” (Hurt 2003: 173).
In sum, the promotion of regionalism has indeed been a consistent and distinctive feature of EU
external relations. The presence of the EU, its success in regional integration and its importance
as an economic actor have served as models and triggered regional cooperation schemes in other
parts of the world. Both conditionality and lesson-drawing/imitation seem to have been at work in
these processes. Yet the scope and design of these schemes are extremely diverse and bear, at best,
superficial resemblance to the EU. In addition, the actual policy of the EU toward and in these
regional arrangements seems at times to undermine rather than strengthen regionalism beyond the
EU.
1 The Cotonou Agreement replaced the Lome´ Convention as the general treaty framework between the EU and
the group of African, Caribbean, and Pacific states. Its focus is on development policy.
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5.2 Human rights and democracy
Just as Bicchi (2006) in the case of regionalism, Tanja Bo¨rzel and Thomas Risse argue that “the
instruments used by the EU to promote democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and ‘good
governance’ look surprisingly similar across the globe”, indicating that “the EU follows quite
clearly a specific cultural script” (Bo¨rzel and Risse 2004: 2). The use of political conditionality,
political dialogue and capacity-building mechanisms in all world regions demonstrate movement
“towards a coherent approach”, which did not follow a grand design but “incremental ‘learning by
doing”’ (Bo¨rzel and Risse 2004: 28–29). However, Bo¨rzel and Risse avowedly fail to analyze the
implementation of the EU’s approach, as well as its effectiveness on the ground. The picture of
consistency quickly becomes blurred when this is taken into account.
The consistency of EU political conditionality is a central issue addressed in the literature,
and the general conclusion is that it is “not consistent”. Inconsistency starts with the fact that
“essential-elements” clauses are not included in agreements with China and the ASEAN countries,
nor with Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. While this may be attributed to the presence of a
stable democracy in the latter cases, this justification clearly does not apply to the Asian countries.
Authors generally recognize that the EU treats countries differently regardless of similarities
in human rights records. Despite the pervasive political and legal rhetoric of democracy and
human rights promotion, actual policy seems to match rhetoric only when consistency is “cheap”;
otherwise, it is driven by a host of other geopolitical, economic or security interests. According
to Karen Smith, “poor, marginal states (often in Africa) of little importance to the EU or one
of its member states tend to be subjected to negative conditionality; these are the cases where
it is easiest to show that you are doing something about human rights” (Smith 2001: 193). In
other cases member states block suspension or termination because this would harm commercial
interests, because the country is strategically or politically too important or because they have
doubts about the effectiveness of negative measures (Smith 2001: 196).
Overriding interest in cooperation on energy issues and the war on terror is also cited as the
main reason why democracy promotion was not prioritized in Central Asia, despite the dismal
political record of the region (Warkotsch 2006). In a comparative analysis of EU responses to
violations of democratic norms in the post-Soviet area, Alexander Warkotsch further shows that,
while the existence of a democracy clause in EU-third country agreements significantly increases
the likelihood of an EU response to anti-democratic policies, it is not significantly correlated with
responses that go beyond verbal denunciation. By contrast, stronger sanctions are more likely
to be used against geographically proximate states and less likely against resource-rich countries
(Warkotsch 2008).
Martin Holland reports that suspensions have mainly hit participants in the Lome´ Convention
and countries that were economically relatively unimportant to the EU; on the other hand, the
EU spared Asian and economically more relevant countries (Holland 2002: 133). In conclusion he
argues that while the “link between development and democratic principles of good government
has become the accepted and inevitable face of North-South relations; the degree to which this
conditionality is supervised and sanctioned remains variable, almost idiosyncratic” (Holland 2002:
135).
Richard Youngs also generally finds that the “the overall distribution of EU trade and aid
provisions did not to any significant extent correlate with democratic criteria” and punishment as
well as rewards “were adopted on an ad hoc basis and not pursued with any coherence or vigour”
(Youngs 2001b: 357). He also observes that the EU has reacted more to massive human rights
abuses and “dramatic interruptions of the democratic process” than to persistently autocratic
governments. “Democratic conditionality has not been systematic.” (Youngs 2001b: 356)
In a statistical analysis of the suspension of development cooperation in reaction to human
rights violations, Hadewych Hazelzet comes to more nuanced results. She finds that “the level of
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respect for human rights or regime type was not significant for the granting of EU development
cooperation” and that the EU was less likely “to impose sanctions on countries with which it has
institutionalised cooperation”, which confirm the general picture of inconsistency (Hazelzet 2005:
9–10). But she also finds that former French and British colonies were sanctioned less severely
than former colonies of other EU member states, indicating the protective influence of France and
Britain (Hazelzet 2005: 10). On the whole, however, her multivariate regression analysis “indicates
that, in the 1990s, overall the level of human rights violations was a more important determinant
for EU sanctions than the level of economic or strategic importance of a country” (Hazelzet 2005:
11). In the end, Hazelzet’s findings refer only to ACP countries. As other authors have pointed
out (see above), this group of countries was of relatively minor economic and strategic importance
to the EU and was thus more likely to be treated consistently than Asian countries.
This inconsistency differs markedly from the fairly consistent and meritocratic use of political
conditionality vis-a`-vis the accession countries (see, e.g., Schimmelfennig 2003: 99–108; Vachudova´
2005). The variation in institutional set-up may be one cause for this discrepancy. In the accession
cases political assessments and decisions are prepared by the Commission in a centralized manner;
beyond applicant countries, governments of member state and the various pillars of the EU are
more strongly involved (Smith 2001; Youngs 2001a: 28–46). Alternatively, the difference can
be explained by a “community effect: when constitutional questions such as membership are at
stake, the pressure to act in line with the constitutive community rules increases. Rule adoption
is expedient for outside cooperation partners but indispensable for future members. Whereas
interest-based considerations are permitted to take the upper hand in relations with external states,
the constitutive community rules will prevail in relations with future insiders” (Schimmelfennig,
Engert, and Knobel 2006: 46).
Beyond Europe, the move toward intergovernmental political conditionality seems thus to have
been a declaratory rather than practical policy. If the EU’s political conditionality approach has
been inconsistent in countries and regions beyond Europe, what about its policies of domestic em-
powerment and socialization? According to Richard Youngs the EU did not pursue these strategies
consistently either. As to civil society assistance, “the EU did not push hard to gain access for
political aid work” and was “unwilling to risk tension with recipient governments”. In its dia-
logue and cooperation “the EU often deliberately sought ways of circumventing its own formal
preconditions, offering concrete sectoral cooperation without the need for a formalization of new
democracy-based discourse” (Youngs 2001a: 193; see also Youngs 2001b: 365). It seems thus to
be a general feature of EU democracy promotion that it has been, as several authors have put it,
“high on rhetoric and low on policy” (Crawford 2005 on Ghana; Warkotsch 2006 on Central Asia).
Elsewhere, Richard Youngs (2004) uses the case of EU human rights promotion in order to make
a general point about the interaction of norms and strategic interests in EU external relations. He
argues that “instrumental choices are made within a range of common normative understandings”
and, in particular, that “security-driven choices [have] been selected within the overarching human
rights framework” (Youngs 2004: 431). In his analysis EU human rights policy has been attuned to
the general promotion of international stability and exhibited a “state-oriented capacity-building
bias” (Youngs 2004: 424).
There is broad agreement in the literature not only on the overall inconsistency of EU strategy,
but also on the overall low impact of the EU on democracy and human rights in non-candidate
third countries. These findings hold regardless of the region under study and strategy used. The
causes of ineffectiveness appear rather overdetermined for political conditionality. First, vis-a`-vis
non-candidate countries, the EU cannot use its most important incentive for compliance – the
prospect of membership. Second, inconsistency hampers effectiveness: the “seemingly variable
application of conditionality . . . detracts from the EU’s international credibility and influence”
(Holland 2002: 135). Third, for the predominantly authoritarian or autocratic governments in
the EU’s neighboring regions, compliance with the EU’s democratic or human rights standards is
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politically costly. It involves the risks of losing political power that, in the perception of third-
country governments, are not offset by the economic or diplomatic rewards the EU has on offer. The
indirect strategies were confronted with the same obstacle when the ruling elites in target states
“perceived that the good governance agenda was elaborated with increasingly political intent”
(Youngs 2001a: 195; see also Tanner 2004: 140–141).
To conclude, EU democracy promotion and human rights policy beyond Europe has used the
three mechanisms of conditionality, socialization and domestic empowerment. In all of these cases,
however, EU policy in third countries and regions has been characterized by low consistency and
effectiveness. In the next section I will review the more recent and specialized literature on the
European Neighborhood Policy in order to find if the general findings hold true there as well.
6 European Neighborhood Policy
The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) was introduced by the EU during the time of its
“big bang” enlargement of 2004 in order to expand and strengthen its relationship with neigh-
boring countries that would not be considered as candidates for membership – at least for the
foreseeable future. Originally conceived to encompass the enlarged EU’s Eastern European neigh-
bors, it was later extended to the Middle Eastern and North African partner countries of the
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (“Barcelona Process”) and further to the Caucasus. It excludes
Russia, however, which insisted on pursuing a separate track of cooperation with the EU (see e.g.
Johansson-Nogue´s 2007 for an overview of the history of ENP).
The ENP can easily be seen as a framework of Europeanization. It was designed by Commission
officials who had previously been in charge of enlargement and applied previously acquired tools
to their new positions (Kelley 2006). It was originally planned to mirror the EEA by extending
the EU market and acquis in the absence of formal membership in EU organizations. In addition,
three principles of enlargement policy appeared in the ENP documents: First, the ENP is based on
the EU’s commitment to promote core liberal values and norms beyond its borders and, second, it
claims to use political conditionality as the main instrument of norm promotion. “Differentiation”
is a fundamental principle of the ENP. In the absence of the membership incentive, the ENP
strategy documents tie both participation in the ENP as such and the intensity and level of
cooperation to the ENP partners’ adherence to liberal values and norms (Maier and Schimmelfennig
2007: 40–42). Third, the EU uses planning, reporting and assistance procedures similar to that
used for candidate countries (Baracani 2009: 136–137).
There are clear differences to enlargement, however, beyond the obvious fact that the ENP is
not designed to guide third countries toward membership. For one, the major incentives designed to
induce Europeanization in ENP countries – a liberalized access of goods and persons to the EU – is
likely to be undermined by protectionist interest groups in the EU, the exclusion of sectors such as
agriculture in which the ENP partners have a competitive edge and fears of crime and uncontrolled
immigration in the EU (Occhipinti 2007; Sedelmeier 2007: 201–205; Vachudova´ 2007).
Second, rather than full transposition of the acquis, the EU’s “expectation is for partial and
progressive alignment with EU legal norms in areas where it makes economic sense, suits the devel-
opment level and serves the development goals of the neighbours” (Noutcheva and Emerson 2007:
91). Moreover, the EU “puts a much stronger emphasis on ‘soft’ and participatory mechanisms
involving the ENP partners” (Sedelmeier 2007: 199). Rather than unilaterally imposed by the
EU based on its acquis, the Action Plans at the core of ENP programming are negotiated and
monitored between the EU and its partners bilaterally and based on “joint ownership”.
Joint ownership, a core principle of the socialization mechanism of Europeanization, is con-
sidered by many to undermine the effectiveness of conditionality. On one hand, “it reduces the
likelihood that bilateral Action Plans reflect the EU’s objective precisely in relations with those
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countries which are furthest from conforming to the conditions preferred by the EU” (Sedelmeier
2007: 200). Governments that do not share the EU’s democracy and human rights agenda, for
instance, can and do minimize the role of political conditionality in their Action Plans. On the
other, it is “at odds with the tough monitoring and reporting by EU institutions that was a precon-
dition for reform-oriented forces to mobilize pressure against reform-adverse governments in East
Central European accession governments” (ibid.). To summarize, Ulrich Sedelmeier expects the
coexistence of conditionality and socialization in the ENP to “undermine their respective potential”
(Sedelmeier 2007: 201).
By contrast, Gwendolyn Sasse finds merit and opportunities in the ENP’s “conditionality-lite”
(Sasse 2008). While she agrees that it is unlikely to produce short-term EU-driven change at
the level of third country governments, ENP conditionality may serve as an external reference
point for longer-term domestic political processes. In her view the vagueness of conditions and
incentives “makes it easier for traditionally Euro-sceptic actors in ENP countries to approach the
EU gradually and selectively” (Sasse 2008: 298).
6.1 Democracy promotion in the ENP
The expectation of (at least short-term) ineffectiveness is borne out by the preliminary evidence
published so far. An analysis of ENP participants’ democracy and human rights records since
they established contractual relations with the EU in the mid-1990s shows that the EU has neither
consistently linked its cooperation agreements with the political situation in these countries, nor
have these countries liberalized as a result of EU political conditionality (Maier and Schimmelfennig
2007: 45–48). Comparisons of ENP Action Plans confirm the absence of a coherent democracy
promotion policy and the overriding importance of the EU’s geostrategic and partner countries’
political interests (Bosse 2007; Baracani 2009).
Studies of EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean confirm this overall assessment. The
EU’s consistent application of political conditionality in this region is undermined by its efforts to
build a multilateral partnership in the Southern Mediterranean and to promote peace in the Middle
East – otherwise it would risk losing essential partners for these efforts. At the end of the day, the
EU,and particularly its southern member states, prefer stable, authoritarian and Western-oriented
regimes to the instability and Islamist electoral victories that genuine democratization processes in
this region are likely to produce (Gillespie and Whitehead 2002: 196; Gillespie and Youngs 2002:
12–13; Youngs 2002: 42; Ju¨nemann 2003: 7).
The EU’s socialization efforts are limited by the same security and stability concerns. Though
EU democracy assistance has been institutionally and financially strengthened, it has remained
modest in scale. In addition, it has been primarily directed towards secular civil society organi-
zations engaged in non-political services that are approved by, and often connected to, partner
governments (Gillespie and Whitehead 2002: 197; Haddadi 2002, 2003; Ju¨nemann 2002; Youngs
2002: 55–57). These assessments stem from the pre-ENP period but have been confirmed by more
recent studies (Pace 2009; Pace, Seeberg, and Cavatorta 2009: 4–5; Youngs 2008).
Given the limits and failures of top-down political conditionality and bottom-up socialization in
the context of the ENP, Sandra Lavenex, Frank Schimmelfennig and their collaborators have begun
to examine an alternative model of democracy promotion in the European Neighborhood. The
“democratic governance” model starts with the assumption that the intensifying web of association
relations between the EU and associated third countries introduces a new form of democracy
promotion through sectoral cooperation. Democratic governance goes beyond “good governance”
in that it includes general attributes of democracy such as horizontal and vertical accountability,
transparency and stakeholder and general participation. It differs from the direct promotion of
democracy in that it does not target the general institutions and processes of the polity, such as
elections, parties, or parliaments, but operates at the level of sectoral policy-making. The EU
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seeks not only to externalize its material acquis rules for regulating public policy in each sector
of political cooperation between the EU and its neighboring countries, but also procedural rules
on how sectoral policies and actors are made transparent, accountable and participatory. Though
democratic governance promotion initially remains at the sectoral level and – in the case of success
– leads to the democratization of sectoral governance, it may spill over into the general polity by
inculcating democratic values, norms and habits on societal and bureaucratic actors and creating
a demand for far-reaching democratization of the entire political system (Freyburg, Skripka, and
Wetzel 2007; Freyburg et al. 2009a).
In an empirical assessment comparing democratic governance promotion in three sectors (asy-
lum, competition and environmental policy) and countries (Moldova, Morocco, and Ukraine), they
show that the EU is, indeed, capable of inducing neighbouring countries to incorporate policy-
specific democratic governance provisions into domestic legislation in the absence of accession
conditionality. This is especially the case when the corresponding EU rules are strongly legalized
and are linked to overarching international norms. The study also shows, however, that the appli-
cation of these provisions in administrative practice has remained weak thus far (Freyburg et al.
2009b).
6.2 External governance beyond democracy promotion
Democracy promotion is the most widely studied area of Europeanization in the European Neigh-
borhood. Studies focusing on other EU rules and policies remain relatively scarce. As in democracy
promotion, the available evidence points to systematic weaknesses in EU impact. At a general level,
Gergana Noutcheva and Michael Emerson show on the basis of World Bank governance scores that
“most of them have regressed rather than progressed on both regulatory quality and rule of law”
between 1996 and 2004 (Noutcheva and Emerson 2007: 90), i.e. during the time that the EU
established institutionalized and – at least on paper – politically conditioned relations with the
neighborhood countries.
In his book on EU external energy policy Stephan Hofer compares EU rule export in Bulgaria,
Serbia and Ukraine (Hofer 2008). His general argument combines the imitation and conditionality
mechanisms. For one, successful EU rule transfer requires that there be an economic necessity
for reform in the country. In addition, however, the EU needs to apply proactive accession con-
ditionality in order to overcome domestic interest group opposition. The absence of this second
condition explains why EU influence in Ukraine has been weak in comparison with Bulgaria and
Serbia. In this sector, however, ineffectiveness may be the result of more than simple reluctance of
the EU to provide a membership incentive and active monitoring. As Adam Stulberg and Sandra
Lavenex point out, the policy field of energy “constitutes a rare set of issues of rough parity between
Brussels and ENP partners” with mutual vulnerabilities and complementary interests (Stulberg
and Lavenex 2007: 137) so that the EU would not have the bargaining power to impose its energy
policy rules on ENP countries unilaterally.
EU bargaining power is also highlighted as a crucial condition of effective rule transfer in two
other studies. Esther Barbe´, Oriol Costa, Anna Herrantz and Michal Natorski (Barbe´ et al. 2009)
ask whose rules the EU and selected neighboring countries (Georgia, Morocco, Russia and Ukraine)
choose for negotiations on foreign and security policy cooperation. They show that EU rules are by
no means the focal point of cooperation and are no more prominent than other international rules
or bilaterally negotiated new rules. Only those countries that harbor hopes of eventual accession
are, on the whole, willing to adopt EU rules. This is why they perceive EU rules as legitimate.
Otherwise, third countries will only orient themselves to EU rules if interdependence with the EU
and EU bargaining power are high. Antoaneta Dimitrova and Rilka Dragneva (2009) emphasize
the limits on the Europeanization of Ukraine imposed by Russia. In a comparison of trade, energy
and foreign policy relations, they show that the effectiveness of EU rule export increases with
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Ukrainian dependence on the EU instead of Russia.
In many respects the ENP can be considered the most likely context for Europeanization beyond
the group of member, quasi-member and candidate countries of the EU. It is here that international
interdependence with the EU and the EU’s efforts to expand its acquis are stronger than in other
regions of the world. Nevertheless, studies of the neighborhood policies overwhelmingly show that
the ENP is inconsistent – both with regard to the expansion of the acquis rules and the use of
conditionality – and is ineffective. Neighborhood countries appear to be willing to adopt EU rules
only if they hope to be considered for full membership in the future and to the extent that the
EU possesses superior bargaining power vis-a`-vis partner countries and alternative governance
providers such as Russia. Both conditions are the exception rather than the rule in the European
Neighborhood.
Therefore, in their study of EU external governance in the area of internal security, Sandra
Lavenex and Nicole Wichmann (2009) start with the assumption that socialization through “net-
work governance”, rather than hierarchical policy transfer through conditionality, is more likely
to be used and effective in EU-neighborhood relations. Though they find abundant evidence of
the existence of such transgovernmental networks, they also come to the conclusion that the oper-
ation and effectiveness of these networks is hampered by incompatible administrative structures,
cultures, expertise and lack of trust.
The findings on the ENP apply a fortiori to the Russian district of Kaliningrad, which has
also recently been analyzed from a Europeanization perspective (Ga¨nzle, Mu¨ntel, and Vinokurov
2008). Although relations between the EU and Kaliningrad are not formally part of the ENP, as an
exclave surrounded by EU territory, Kaliningrad was designed to be a “pilot region” for enhanced
EU-Russia relations. In spite of this particular geographic situation and the interdependence that
comes with it, Europeanization has remained very weak and selective (Ga¨nzle and Mu¨nter 2008).
Generally, the low level of regional autonomy, and Russia’s insistence on safeguarding sovereignty
and being treated as a special partner (Meloni 2008), limit the impact of EU rules. But “weak
institutional capabilities and lack of interest” prevent Europeanization even in policy areas with
comparatively high regional autonomy (Ga¨nzle and Mu¨nter 2008: 251).
7 Conclusions
In the introductory sections of the review, I proposed to use the literature on Europeanization
in candidate states for membership as a benchmark for the analysis of “Europeanization beyond
Europe”. In general, the findings reported here suggest that the dividing line between candidate
states and other third countries also constitutes a categorical difference for the analysis of the
effects of Europeanization.
First, though the acquis communautaire is at the core of Europeanization in the case of “quasi-
members” and candidate countries, the goals and contents of Europeanization beyond Europe
– at least those analyzed in the majority of the literature – are of a more general character.
“Regionalism” may still count as an EU-specific goal, which, if effectively pursued, would result
in a distinctive “Europeanization” beyond Europe, other core goals such as stability and security
or democracy and human rights are clearly less related to the EU’s acquis and less specific to the
EU’s external relations. However, there is a clear tendency in more recent literature on the ENP
to redress the balance in favor of the whole range of EU policies.
Second, even though positive political conditionality became a general feature of EU relations
with third countries in the 1990s, it has been used less consistently than in EU relations with
potential member states. Moreover, other instruments for promoting EU core values and norms
– such as domestic empowerment of civil society or socialization through transgovernmental co-
operation – do not appear to have been consistent and effective substitutes for political accession
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conditionality, even if they were described as unique EU strategies.
Third, the Europeanizing impact of these strategies has been weak beyond the group of credible
candidates for EU membership. The causes for weak impact are probably manifold: low incentives
and low consistency of policy on the part of the EU, and serious domestic obstacles to Europeaniza-
tion on the part of third countries. In sum, membership, or the prospect or hope of membership,
appears to be a crucial condition of Europeanization. With regard to its specific normative and
regulatory content and its instruments and its impact, Europeanization beyond Europe is substan-
tially weaker than Europeanization in Europe. This, however, need not be the last word on the
issue.
1) The literature conveys the picture that Europeanization efforts beyond Europe are inconsis-
tent and ineffective overall, but this does not mean that there are no cases of consistent policy and
effective impact. Searching for such cases and studying their conditions in comparison with similar
cases may generate better knowledge of the differential effects and the conditions of Europeaniza-
tion in non-candidate countries. In general, we need further carefully designed and theory-guided
comparative studies that directly address and assess the causality question between EU policies
and domestic change.
2) Though most Europeanization literature focuses very much on policies, policy-making pro-
cesses and administrative structures, the literature reviewed here was mainly about polity: regional
integration and constitutional structure. Studies mirroring the general focus on policy and politics
related to policy-making might well find a stronger impact of “Europe” on third countries. The
few studies on the impact of EU external governance in the European Neighborhood mentioned
above confirm this expectation. Even though it is far from the common and systematic impact of
accession negotiations on candidate countries, the ENP does produce selective rule export – above
all where EU bargaining power is high and third countries harbor hopes of being considered for
accession in the future. More work of this kind is needed.
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